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Résumé: Cet article présente les modèles statistiques conduisant à la tarification a posteriori en 
assurance. Les corrélations entre variables de risque peuvent s'expliquer de manière endogène 
ou exogène. L'interprétation retenue par les modèles actuariels est exogène et reflète la 
contagion positive habituellement observée pour les nombres de sinistres. Cette contagion 
positive peut être expliquée par la révélation dans le temps de caractéristiques cachées des lois 
de risque. Ces caractéristiques sont représentées par des effets fixes qui sont prédits avec un 
modèle à effets aléatoires. Cet article aborde les problèmes d'identification de la nature de la 
dynamique des données d'assurance non-vie. Des exemples de prédiction sont donnés pour 
des modèles de comptage avec des effets aléatoires constants ou dynamiques, une ou 
plusieurs équations, et pour des modèles sur les nombres et les coûts d'évènements. 
 
Abstract: This paper presents statistical models which lead to experience rating in insurance. Serial 
correlation for risk variables can receive endogeneous or exogeneous explanations. The 
interpretation retained by actuarial models is exogeneous and reflects the positive contagion 
usually observed for the number of claims. This positive contagion can be explained by the 
revelation throughout time of a hidden features in the risk distributions. These features are 
represented by fixed effects which are predicted with a random effects model. This article 
discusses identification issues on the nature of the dynamics of non-life insurance data. 
Example of predictions are given for count data models with a constant or time-varying 
random effects, one or several equations, and for cost-number models on events. 
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1 Introduction
The assessment of individual risks in non life insurance raises problems which occur
in any statistical analysis of longitudinal data. An insurance rating model computes
risk premiums, which are estimations of risk levels, themselves expectations of risk
variables. These variables are either numbers of claims or are related to their severity
(the cost of the claim, or the duration of a compensation). The risk levels assessed
in this paper are the frequency of claims and the pure premium, which refers to the
expected loss or to its estimation.
Experience rating in non-life insurance is almost systematic, and can be justified
with two arguments.
• The first argument is actuarial neutrality. For non-life insurance data, a claim-
less period usually implies a reduction in frequency premium for the next pe-
riods, whereas an accident triggers an increase in the premium. Hence bonus-
malus systems (i.e. no-claim discounts and increases in premium after a claim)
can be justified with an actuarial neutrality argument.
• The second argument are the incentives to risk prevention created by expe-
rience rating. There is a short-term eﬃciency of eﬀort in reducing non-life
insurance risks,1 and experience rating may create these incentives under con-
ditions which are recalled later in this article. Things are diﬀerent for health
and life risks. These risks are related to a capital, the depletion of which is
partly irreversible. Prevention eﬀorts are ineﬃcient in the short run, and there
is a reclassification risk which makes experience rating very uncommon.2
The predictive ability on risks of individual histories reflects two possible inter-
pretations. On the one hand, histories reveal an unobserved heterogeneity, which
has a residual status with respect to observable information on the risk units. On
the other hand, histories modify risk levels, either through incentives or through psy-
chological eﬀects. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) proposed an “availability bias”
theory, where the subjective estimation of the frequency of an event is based on how
easily a related outcome can be brought to mind. An accident may then increase
the perceived risk level and consequently prevention activities. At the opposite, the
“gambler’s fallacy” argument (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) suggests that individ-
uals will feel protected from a risk after the occurrence of a related event. In that
1Risk reduction applies on frequency rather than severity in most of the economic literature.
Hence prevention is of the "self-protection" rather than of the "self-insurance" type, with the
Ehrlich-Becker (1972) terminology.
2Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) mention however term life insurance contracts in the US that oﬀer
state contingent prices, where low premiums are contingent on the insured showing he is still in
good health.
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case, prevention activities decrease after an accident, which entails an increase in
risk as for the revelation eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity.
Experience rating is performed in the actuarial literature through a revelation
principle. Unobserved heterogeneity on risks is taken into account with mixture
models, where the mixing distribution reflects the weight of unobserved information.
Individual fixed eﬀects reflect the relative risk between an individual and his peers
(i.e. with the same regression components). Experience rating is obtained through
the prediction of this fixed eﬀect, which is performed from a demixing derivation.
Parametric approaches can be used (see Lemaire (1995) for a survey of frequency
risk models), but semiparametric derivations pioneered by Bühlmann (1967) in the
actuarial literature are also very popular. Non-life insurance is thus one of the
domains that has oﬀered to Karl Pearson a posthumous revenge on Ronald Fisher.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes experience rating schemes
in the non-life insurance business as well as cross-subsidies between periods. Section
3 recalls the usual representations of unobserved heterogeneity by fixed and random
eﬀects models, and the experience rating strategies in relation with the type of spec-
ification of the mixing distribution (whether parametric, semiparametric, and non
parametric). Section 4 present the "generalized linear models" (Nelder and Wedder-
burn (1972), Zeger et al. (1986)), of current use in non-life insurance rating. Section
5 discusses the nature of the dynamics in non-life insurance, a point developed in
more detail by Chiappori and Salanié (2012) in connection with economic theory.
Lastly, Section 6 presents examples of frequency and pure premium risk models.
2 Experience rating schemes and cross-subsidies
in the non-life insurance industry
There is a trend towards deregulation in the automobile insurance industry, but
bonus-malus systems are still in force in the world (either compulsory as in France,
or not but used by most of the competitors as in Belgium). A bonus-malus system
summarizes an event history, where events are most often claims at fault. This
coeﬃcient is updated each year, decreases after a claimless year (no-claim discount)
and increases if events are reported during the year. The insurance premium is
the product of the bonus-malus coeﬃcient and of a basic premium. A bonus-malus
system enforces the experience rating policy if the basic premium does not depend
on the individual history. This is not the case any more in France, but the bonus-
malus system provides an information available to all the competitors in the market.
Reducing information rents is now the role of bonus-malus systems, more than
enforcing experience rating rules.3
3Ten years ago, the European Commission sued France, arguing that the bonus-malus system
distorted competition. As an answer, French authorities argued that the bonus-malus system did
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Let us consider for instance the updating rules for bonus-malus coeﬃcients in
France. A new driver begins with a bonus-malus coeﬃcient equal to one, and this
coeﬃcient is equal to 095 after one year if no claim at fault is reported. The coef-
ficient is equal to (125) if  claims at fault are reported during the first year, and
is bounded by 35. The same rules are applied later to the new coeﬃcient. Besides,
there is a lower bound of 05 for the coeﬃcient. If the bonus-malus coeﬃcient is
equal to 095 you have a five percent bonus, whereas a claim at fault entails a twenty
five percent malus. In this example, the bonus-malus coeﬃcient is roughly an ex-
ponential function of the number of claims at fault. In other countries, the average
coeﬃcient after a given number of years is usually a convex function of the number
of claims. As the bonus-malus coeﬃcient is updated from the preceding value and
from the claim history in the last year, bonus-malus systems can be expressed as
Markov chains (see Lemaire (1995)).
Actual bonus-malus systems always have a “crime and punishment” flavour. The
events which trigger a malus are usually claims at fault. If a no-fault system is in
force as in several states of the United States and in Quebec, claims at fault are
often replaced in the experience rating scheme by oﬀences against the highway safety
code. You can also think of mixing the history of claims and oﬀences in the rating
structure. In the USA, insurers have direct access to records of the Motor Vehicles
Division. In states with a tort compensation system (i.e. fault is determined if
the accident involves a third party), insurance companies use both types of events
in their experience rating schemes. A speeding ticket related to more than fifteen
m.p.h. above the speed limit entails the same penalty as an accident at fault, and
so does failure to stop at a traﬃc light, or failure to respect a stop sign. The worst
oﬀence consists in overtaking a school bus while its red lights are blinking. It is
worth nine points, instead of five for the aforementioned events.
Fairness in the rating structure is made necessary because of the diﬃculty to
maintain cross subsidies between diﬀerent risk levels in a competitive setting. Hence,
risk premiums are usually seen as estimations of expectations of risk variables con-
ditional on an information available to the insurance company. A question is raised
about the private or public nature of this information. Insurance companies are
not forced by competition to use private information on their policyholders in their
rating structure. A compulsory bonus-malus system makes this information partly
public, since it provides a summary of the policyholder’s behaviour which can be
shown to every competitor of the insurance company.
Cross-subsidies between the periods of a contract are termed as either "back-
loading" or "front-loading", depending on whether the first periods are subsidized
by the following ones, or the contrary. "Back-loading" in insurance contracts may
occur when the insurer extracts a rent from the policyholder based on its use of
not enforce experience rating. They finally won the case.
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private information (Kunreuther and Pauly, 1985), or from the maximization of
a customer’s value derived from an estimated lapse behavior (Taylor, 1986).4 In
a recent study of an Australian automobile insurance portfolio, Nini and Kofman
(2011) find that average risk decreases with policyholder tenure, but that the eﬀect
is entirely due to the impact of observable information. This results contradicts the
theory of informational monopoly power.5
3 Allowance for unobserved heterogeneity by ran-
dom eﬀects models
This section does not provide a self-content presentation of such models and of their
applications to experience rating. A more detailed exposition is given in Pinquet
(2000). Classic references are Lemaire (1995) for parametric models, and Bühlmann,
Gisler (2005) for semiparametric approaches.6 Denuit, Maréchal et al. (2007) pro-
vide a comprehensive presentation on count data models applied to non-life insur-
ance. We recall later the main features of fixed and random eﬀects models applied to
experience rating, and we illustrate with a basic example in non-life insurance (i.e. a
frequency risk model on a single type of event). We consider a sample of risk units,
and we interpret data dynamics within these units (e.g., between diﬀerent periods
of time series) with a revelation principle. Three levels are used in the rating model.
• The first level is an a priori rating model which does not allow for unobserved
heterogeneity. An important assumption is that the risk variables defined
within a statistical unit are independent. Hence data dynamics are only ex-
plained by the revelation of unobserved heterogeneity.
• A second level includes individual fixed eﬀects in the a priori rating model.
These fixed eﬀects reflect idiosyncratic features of risk distributions that are
not represented by the regression components. The independence assumption
is not challenged at this level.
4Kunreuther and Pauly’s model is derived in a no-commitment setting, with myopic consumers
(i.e. those who take decisions based on the current contract). Taylor uses a multiperiod approach
where the premium is the control variable in the maximization of the customer value. The model
also includes an elasticity between the lapse rate and relative prices between the incumbent insurer
and its competitors.
5At the opposite, life and health insurance products are often front-loaded, and sometimes
heavily without any surrender value as is the case for long-term care insurance. Hendel and Lizzeri
(2003) provide an economic analysis of front-loading in term-life insurance in the US.
6In most statistical problems, a parameter set has a much smaller dimension than that of
the probability set it aims at describing. A parametric approach is a one-to-one map from the
parameter set to the probability set. In a semiparametric setting, the parameters are related to
constraints on the probabilities.
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• The third level is the random eﬀects model. The fixed eﬀects are assumed
to be outcomes of random eﬀects. The distributions of the random eﬀects
model are mixtures of those of the a priori rating model. These distributions
are those of a class of real individuals with the same observable information,
represented by the regression components.
Experience rating is obtained from a prediction of the fixed eﬀect (plugged mul-
tiplicatively into the expectation of the risk variable) for the next period. This
prediction can either be obtained from a posterior likelihood in a parametric set-
ting, or from constraining the shape of the predictor in a semiparametric setting.
In the latter case, this shape must be aﬃne in order to make derivations tractable,
and this type of risk prediction is usually termed as the linear credibility approach.
Risk prediction with the random eﬀects model implicitly supposes that the dynam-
ics observed on the data are only due to a revelation mechanism. To what extent
this approach limits risk description is discussed later.
Let us describe a basic example of frequency risk model. The statistical units are
indexed by  = 1      and the dependent variable is a sequence of claims numbers.
We denote it as
 = ()=1;  ∼  ()  = exp()
A duration  of risk exposure must be included in the parameter of the Poisson
distribution if these durations are not constant on the sample. In the a priori rating
model, the variables  are independent and this property also holds in the fixed
eﬀects model
 ∼  ( )
The reference value of the time-independent fixed eﬀect  is one. If   1, the
individual  is riskier than the average of its peers with respect to the regression
components.
The random eﬀects model (where the fixed eﬀect  is the outcome of ) can be
defined parametrically, with an explicit distribution for  The distribution of 
is defined by an expectation with respect to , i.e.
 [ = ] =  £ ()¤ =  hexp(− )×  ! i 
With Gamma distributions, ( ∼ ( ) : () = 1  () = 1) the distribu-
tions of the risk variables are negative binomial. Extensions of the negative binomial
model to panel data are given in Hausman et al. (1984).
A semiparametric specification stems from the equation
() = 1⇒ () = ;  () =  + ¡2 ×  ()¢ (1)
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in the random eﬀects model. It appears that the variance 2 of the random eﬀect is
the natural parameter of the mixing distribution in a semiparametric approach.
The prediction b+1 of the fixed eﬀect  with a linear credibility approach stems
from a linear probabilistic regression of  with respect to the  ( = 1     ) in
the random eﬀects model. The solution is
b+1 = 1 +
µ b2 × P
=1

¶
1 +
µ b2 × P
=1
c¶  (2)
where a consistent estimation of the variance of the random eﬀect is obtained from
(1) as
b2 = P
h
( − c)2 − ciP
 c2  (3)
The predictor of equation (2) is also obtained with an expected value principle in
a Poisson model with Gamma random eﬀects (Dionne and Vanasse, 1989). The
semiparametric estimator of the variance is unconstrained and is positive only if
there is overdispersion on the data (i.e. if the residual variance is greater than the
empirical mean).7 A consistent estimation strategy of the parameters of a random
eﬀects models is detailed in the next section in a semiparametric framework. This
strategy exploits two results that are obtained in this example.
• First, the expectation of the risk variable in the random eﬀects model does
not depend on 2. As a consequence, the estimation of  in the Poisson model
is consistent in the model with random eﬀects.
• Second, equation (3) provides an estimator of 2 that depends on b. This is
due to a separability property in the specification of the variance of the risk
variable in the random eﬀects model.
The prediction of the fixed eﬀect  obtained from a posterior expectation in
the negative binomial model is the same as that obtained with the linear credibility
approach. This predictor can be written as a weighted average of 1 = (), and
of the ratio
P
 
P
 c, which summarizes the individual history and which can
be seen as an estimator of the fixed eﬀect . The weight given to this ratio is the
credibility
 =
b2 ×P c
1 +
³ b2 ×P c´  (4)
7We have
P
d =P  from the orthogonality between the residuals and the intercept.
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which ranges in [0 1] and increases with risk exposure (represented by the cumulated
frequency premium) and the estimated variance b2, which represents the weight of
unobserved heterogeneity. From the weighted average definition of the predictor,
the credibility is the discount on the frequency premium (the "bonus") if no claims
are reported.
The experience rated premium for the next period is b+1 × b+1. The pre-
dictor b+1 summarizes the individual history and can be interpreted as a "bonus-
malus" coeﬃcient. From equation (2), the estimated variance of the random eﬀect is
close to the relative increase in premium after a claim (the "malus") if risk exposure
is close to 0.
The linear shape of the predictor in this example can be challenged. Prediction
with a posterior expectation would not be linear in the number of past claims if the
mixing distribution was not of the Gamma type. We might want to obtain other
shapes as the exponential one in the French bonus-malus system.
The parametric and semiparametric approaches of risk prediction both rely on
restrictions. The mixing distribution family is constrained in the parametric ap-
proach, whereas the shape of the predictor is constrained in the semiparametric
setting. Discarding these restrictions is possible with a non parametric analysis of
the mixing distribution. Such approaches are feasible, but they can be applied only
with high frequency data, which is not the case in non-life insurance. To see this,
consider the moment result on Poisson distributions
 ∼  ()⇒  [ × ( − 1)   × ( −  + 1)] =  ∀ ∈ N∗ (5)
If  follows a mixture of a  () distributions, where  is the outcome of a random
eﬀect  , we have that
() = 1⇒ () =  [ × ( − 1)   × ( −  + 1)] = [( )]  (6)
Then the mixing distribution can be identified from a sequence of moments of in-
creasing order (i.e., going from a semiparametric to a non parametric approach
through a representation of the mixing distribution by moments of increasing or-
der).8 However equation (6) suggests that the accuracy of the estimation of a high
order moment of the random eﬀect is weak if the frequency risk ( ) is low. This
is the case in non-life insurance, and explains why experience rating models restrict
to parametric and semiparametric approaches.
3.1 Statistical models on count data of the (a,b,k) type
This article deals mostly with frequency risk models, and we present a distribution
family on count data that encompasses the usual ones. This distribution family on
8See Zhang (1990) for an approximation of the Fourier transform of the mixing distribution.
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N is defined from (  ) (with 0    1   0 and  ∈ N) in the following way
(Klugman, Panjer, and Willmot, 2008):
• If  is the probability related to  ∈ N, the () are defined without any
constraints other than their belonging to the simplex of probabilities.
• The tail distribution is defined from the recurrence relation
 = −1 ×
µ
+ 
¶
    (7)
This equation allows to denote the ratio (
P
 ) as (  ). Then the
tail distribution is defined from
 = 1−
P
 
1 +(  )
and from equation (7).
Let us recover usual distribution families on count data as distributions of the
(  ) type.
• A Poisson distribution  () is obviously of the (0  0) type.
• A "zero inflated" distribution linked with a variable × , where  ∼ (1 )
and  ∼  () are independent variables (see Boucher, Denuit, and Guillén
(2009) for applications to insurance rating) is of the type (0  1), with 0 =
exp(−) + [(1− )× (1− exp(−))] ≥ exp(−).
• Let us consider a negative binomial distribution, obtained as a mixture of
 () distributions, where  is the outcome of  ,  ∼ ( ). It is easily
seen that this distribution is of the type
³

+  ×(−1)+  0
´
. Hence, all the
distributions of the (  0) type are either of the Poisson or of the negative
binomial type.
Distributions of the (  ) type, with   1 can be considered if the frequency
is not too low.
4 Estimation approaches for random eﬀects mod-
els
4.1 The Generalized Estimating Equations
Statistical models are designed depending on the nature of the dependent variable.
For instance, a binary distribution is defined by its expectation, and the model deals
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with the link between this expectation (and the related probability) and regression
components. Going from the most constrained distribution in terms of support (the
binary distributions) to the less constrained (variables that range on the whole real
line) allows to disconnect completely the expectation and moments of higher order,
including the variance. Between these two polar cases, non-life insurance models first
deal with count variables, where events are insurance claims. The claim frequency
per year is usually far less than one, which constrains the design of statistical models
as mentioned in the preceding section.
The Generalized Estimating Equations approach (Zeger et al., 1986) proposes
an estimation strategy from the a second order specification of the moments of a
dependent risk variable, that can be applied for frequency risk and linear models.
Let  be a statistical unit in a sample of size , and let  be a risk variable ranging in
R. The statistical unit may include time series, strata, multiple equations related
to diﬀerent guarantees or to a frequency-cost specification, etc. The expectation
and the variance of  are denoted as
( | )  ( |   )
The parameters   ( ∈ R1   ∈ R2) of the model are included hierarchically,
and the specific parameters of the mixing distribution represented by  do not in-
fluence the expectation of the risk variable.9 These specific parameters are usually
second-order moments of random eﬀects. These random eﬀects are plugged addi-
tively in the expectation of  for linear models and multiplicatively for frequency
risk models. The independence of () with respect to  is obtained from obvious
constraints on the expectation of the random eﬀects in the additive and multiplica-
tive setting. These specifications also yield separability properties which allow to
estimate  from  and the observations, using cross-section moment equations. Let
us consider a statistic (   ) such as
 (   ) ∈ R2 ;  [(   ) |   ] ≡ 0;

(   ) is invertible. (8)
We have for instance: (   ) = P [( − )2 − ] − 2P 2 for the
basic example developed in the preceding section, where  = 2 is the variance of a
scalar random eﬀect. We suppose that
X
=1
(   ) = 0⇔ ∃!   = b(; 1     ; 1     )
9The independence of the random eﬀects distribution with respect to the regression components
can be challenged. This issue is dicussed by Boucher, Denuit (2006) and by Bolancé, Guillén,
Pinquet (2008).
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This condition is linked to the invertibility condition given in (8), and the solution
 does not necessarily belongs to the parameter set, as is the case for the example
if there is underdispersion.
The algorithm b b → b+1 b+1 is then the following: first, the variances-
covariances matrices of risk unitsb  =  ( |  b b)
are derived from the current estimations of the parameters. Then the estimations
at the next step are obtained as follows:
b+1 = argmin X || −( | )||2[ ]−1 = argmin ( b b); (9)
b+1 = b(b+1; 1     ; 1     )
The algorithm can be initialized at step  = 0 with b0 = 0, which corresponds to
no unobserved heterogeneity, and with b0 = argmin (  0), with the notations
of equation (9).
This estimated approach is semiparametric and unconstrained with respect to
the parameters of the mixing distribution.10 An estimation obtained outside the
parameter domain is a failure of the model which corresponds to an estimation ob-
tained at the boundary of the parameter set with a constrained estimation approach.
In the example studied in this article, a negative estimation for the variance 2 of the
random eﬀect corresponds to a residual underdispersion on the data. A maximum
likelihood estimation of a parametric mixture of Poisson distributions would lead
to a null estimated variance. Indeed, the numerator of the ratio which defines the
unconstrained estimator of the variance given in (3) is equal to twice the Lagrangian
of the log-likelihood with respect to 2 at the frontier of the parameter set. Then
underdispersion leads to a local maximum of the likelihood, which actually is global.
When the mixing distribution family is more intricate, a constrained estimation ob-
tained at the boundary of the parameter set may indicate feasible submodels more
clearly than an unconstrained approach.
4.2 Other estimating approaches
Let us consider first a parametric setting. The likelihood of a random eﬀects model
is an expectation, which does not have a closed form in most cases. The likelihood
can be then approximated, and two types of computation can be investigated.
• Numerical integration of the likelihood. If the likelihood is viewed as a para-
meter, the approximation is a biased and deterministic estimator. See Davis and
10The parameter set for  is usually a convex cone in R2 .
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Rabinowitz (1984) for methods of numerical integration using Gaussian quadrature
rules, and Lillard (1993) for empirical results.
• Monte-Carlo methods interpret the likelihood as the expectation of a function
of a distribution-free variable. An average derived from independent draws of this
variable for each individual leads to a simulation-based estimator. The likelihood is
then approximated by a random and unbiased variable. Owing to the concavity of
the logarithm, the estimator of the log-likelihood has a negative bias. The asymp-
totic properties of these estimators are given by Gouriéroux and Monfort (1991).
Consistency is obtained if the number of simulations converges towards infinity with
the size of the sample.
We come back to a semiparametric setting. In the Generalized Estimating Equa-
tions approach presented in Section 4.1, the first and second order moments of the
dependent variable have implicitly a closed form in the random eﬀects model. How-
ever this assumption does not hold in most cases for binary variables. Suppose that
these moments are approximated by simulations. If the simulation errors are inde-
pendent across observations and suﬃciently regular with respect to the parameters,
the simulation-based estimators can be consistent even if the number of draws are
fixed for each individual. Consistency is obtained if a linearity property allows the
simulation errors to be averaged out over the sample. A proof of these properties
and applications to discrete response models are found in Mac Fadden (1989).
5 The nature of the dynamics on non-life insur-
ance data
Random eﬀect models reflect the observed dynamics on non-life insurance data, as
estimated risks usually decrease with time and increase with claims. This time-event
property fits the "bonus-malus" logic of risk prediction based on random eﬀects
models. Two points will be developed further.
• The first point is the analysis of the data dynamics. The observed dynamics
on risks reflect both revelation and modification eﬀects of the individual his-
tories. The revelation eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity is not intrinsic, as it
is defined with respect to the observable information. The individual histories
modify the risks levels due to incentive eﬀects (the homo œconomicus reacts
to the financial implications of his behaviour), but also to psychological eﬀects
that influence risk perception and tastes. These eﬀects usually counteract the
revelation eﬀects, but this is not always true and will be discussed in the next
section.
• The second point is the identifiability issue of the two components of the
dynamics. The main motivation is to analyze the incentive eﬀects of insurance
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rating. This point is also analyzed by Chiappori and Salanié (2012).
5.1 Incentives eﬀects of non-life insurance rating schemes
The incentive properties of an insurance rating scheme are obtained from the mini-
mization of the lifetime disutility of future premiums. The incentive level is related
to the increase in the future premiums after a claim. From the exponential structure
of the French bonus-malus system, a claim at fault (which triggers the "malus") in-
creases the incentives to safe driving (see Abbring, Chiappori, Pinquet, 2003). The
risk level decreases after a claim, which counteracts the revelation eﬀect of unob-
served heterogeneity. However an opposite eﬀect could be obtained if the potential
penalties did not increase after a claim (i.e. if the premiumwas not a convex function
of the number of past claims, for a given risk exposure).
The time eﬀects of incentives are at the opposite of the event eﬀect, and the
relative weights depend on the equilibrium of the rating scheme. Let us consider
the French bonus-malus system. A 25% malus balances a 5% bonus if the annual
frequency of claims is close to 16. The frequency of claims at fault is actually equal
to 6%, and the French bonus-malus system is downwards biased, as is the case for
most of the experience rating schemes (see Lemaire, 1995). Drivers cluster at the
lowest levels of the bonus-malus scale when their seniority increases, and are subject
on average to decreasing incentives. This means that the time eﬀect of incentives
outweigh the event eﬀect in this context. It is worth mentioning that the result also
depends on the frequency risk of the driver.
The time eﬀect of incentives can reinforce the revelation eﬀect if the reward for
a claimless history consists in cancelling the claim record after a given duration.
This feature exits in the French bonus-malus system for drivers with a bad claim
history. If their bonus-malus coeﬃcient is greater than one (that of a beginner),
they are considered as beginners after a two year claimless history.11 An informal
argument to explain this result is that the date of claim removal does not vary with
time, and that safe driving eﬀort increases as this date comes nearer. A more formal
argument is that the incentive level increases with the diﬀerence between the lifetime
disutility of premiums in the state reached after a claim, and the disutility in the
current state. The time counter is reset to zero after a claim, and the disutility after
a claim is constant. As the current disutility decreases with time, the diﬀerence
increases with time and so does the incentive level. Then risk decreases with time
11The same logic is applied in many point-record driving licenses (where events are traﬃc viola-
tions which are associated to demerit points, and where the driving license is suspended once the
cumulated demerit points reach a given threshold). In France and in many European countries,
all the demerit point are removed after a given period of violation-free driving. In the US and in
Canada, point removal is performed on each traﬃc oﬀense once a given seniority is reached. The
incentive properties of point-record mechanisms are studied by Bourgeon and Picard (2007), and
by Dionne, Pinquet et al. (2011).
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as for the revelation eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity. Hence incentive eﬀects do
not always counteract revelation eﬀects in non-life insurance.
5.2 Identifiability issues in the analysis of non-life insurance
data dynamics
Early statistical literature did not grasp the identification issue raised by the in-
terpretation of individual histories. Discussing a paper written by Neyman (1939),
Feller (1943) mentions the two interpretations of the negative binomial model with
revelation and modification stories. These two interpretations of data dynamics are
also termed as heterogeneity and state dependence. Feller remarks that this twofold
interpretation is not understood by most of statisticians, including Neyman.12 Feller
concludes to the impossibility of identifying the nature of the dynamics of longitudi-
nal data. At the end of his article, he suggests that a duration-event analysis could
help improve identification.
This article was taken seriously by Neyman, who wrote an article with Bates
a decade later (Bates and Neyman, 1952) proposing an elimination strategy of un-
observed heterogeneity for a point process of the Poisson type. They restrict their
analysis to individuals with a single event observed on a given interval. The date
distribution of this event is uniform, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of fit to a
uniform distribution allows to integrate out unobserved heterogeneity in the test
for the absence of state dependence, according to Neyman. Many papers in econo-
metric literature (see Chiappori and Salanié (2012), for a survey) stem from this
contribution.
Bates and Neyman’s conclusion is however overoptimistic. Indeed, a mixture of
Poisson processes can be applied to real individuals and not to a class of individuals
sharing the same available information. In that case, the history modifies the indi-
vidual distributions instead of revealing them, although the null assumption tested
for by Bates and Neyman is fulfilled. For instance, a mixture of a Poisson process
with a parameter  and a ( ) mixing distribution is associated to a Markov
process with integer values, where the only positive transition intensities are those
from  to + 1 ( ∈ N) and equal to
() =  + + 
at date . We obtain a Pólya process, with negative binomial marginal distributions.
The date distribution of a unique event in a given interval is also uniform, as we
show now. Let us consider an interval [0  ] and  the number of events between
12Neyman was far from being a beginner when he wrote this paper. He already had published
his results on optimal tests with Egon Pearson.
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0 et . We denote Λ() = R 0 () . We have that
 [ = 1] =
Z 
0
exp(−Λ0())0() exp(Λ1()− Λ1( )) 
where  is the date of the unique event. The density of this date is equal to 0()×
exp(Λ1()−Λ0()), up to a multiplicative constant. The log-derivative of the density
is equal to
³
000
´
+1−0 The null assumption tested for by Bates and Neyman
reflects an equilibrium between the time and event components of the data dynamics,
i.e.
00
0 (time); 1 − 0 (event) (10)
In the Pólya process, we have 000  0 and 1 − 0  0 But opposite signs
can be observed for these components if they are related to incentives derived from
a convex rating structure, as discussed in the preceding section. The time-event
psychological eﬀects can also be represented by equation (10). The "availability
eﬀect" is associated to an increasing link between time and risk, and to a decreasing
event-risk link. Results are at the opposite for the "gambler’s fallacy" eﬀect. As a
conclusion, what is eliminated by the Bates-Neyman test is unobserved heterogeneity
applied to balanced time-event eﬀects on real individuals.13
6 Examples of frequency and pure premium risk
models
6.1 Multiple equations and stratified samples
Diﬀerent types of claims can be used in the prediction of non-life insurance risks,
as for instance claims at fault and not at fault, accidents and traﬃc violations (in a
framework where traﬃc violations are used for experience rating and not accidents
in a no-fault environment). These diﬀerent types of claims can be nested (e.g.
accidents with bodily injury among accidents of all type in automobile insurance:
see section 6.3), or overlap partially or not. In a situation where event types (e.g.
type  and type ) overlap partially, a random eﬀects model should be applied to
non overlapping events (e.g.  −   −  and  ∩ ). Mixing distributions can
be estimated in a semiparametric framework (Pinquet, 1998) or with parametric
specifications (Frees and Valdez, 2008). For small risk exposures, it can be shown
that the predictive ability of a given type of event on another type in a frequency
risk model is proportional to the product of the frequency risk and of the squared
13The test proposed by Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003) eliminates unobserved hetero-
geneity in some unbalanced time-event frameworks.
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covariance of the random eﬀects related to each type and applied multiplicatively
to the frequency.
Stratified samples are for examples fleets of vehicles (Desjardins et al. (2001),
Angers et al. (2006)), whether owned by companies or households. The history of a
contract should have a greater ability to predict the risk level of this contract than
that of the other contracts in the same stratum. The relative eﬃciencies are obtained
from the comparison between the variance of a random eﬀect at the stratum level
and the residual variance at the individual level.
6.2 Allowance for the age of claims in experience rating
Real-world experience rating schemes in property-liability insurance mostly depend
on numbers of events, which are usually claims at fault. Only in a few publications
(Gerber and Jones, 1975; Sundt, 1988; Bolancé, Guillén and Pinquet, 2003) do
frequency risk models take into account the age of events. These contributions use
the intuition that the predictive ability for a period of the policyholder’s history
should decrease with age. If a stationary specification is retained for time-varying
random eﬀects in a Poisson model, the estimated autocorrelation coeﬃcients should
be decreasing. This shape is indeed usually obtained from non-life insurance data.
With time-independent random eﬀects, total credibility converges to one as fre-
quency risk exposure increases (see equation (4), and remember that credibility is
the no-claim discount related to a claimless history). This result does not hold any
more with dynamic random eﬀects. Limit credibility can be much less than one, a
result in accordance with real-world rating structures.
A bonus-malus system designed from a model with dynamic random eﬀects and
a decreasing autocorrelation function will behave in the following way. For a poli-
cyholder with a faultless history, the no-claim discounts induced by a claimless year
are smaller after a few years than those obtained from the usual credibility model,
but they are more important if claims were reported recently. The explanation is
the same in both cases. The credibility granted to a given period of the past de-
creases rapidly as time goes by, due to the increase of risk exposure but mostly to
the diminution of the autocorrelation coeﬃcients. Notice that economic analysis
also suggests that optimal insurance contracts with moral hazard should penalize
recent claims more than older ones (Henriet and Rochet, 1986).
Dynamics on longitudinal count data can also be obtained from endogeneous
approaches. The integer autoregressive model of order one (or INAR(1) model)
writes as follows for a single time series
 =  +
−1X
=1

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The number of events at the current period, is the sum of two independent variables.
The first variable is a number of events without link to those occurred in the past,
and represents an innovation. The second variable is a sum of Bernoulli variables
indexed by the events occurred at the preceding period, and provides a causality
relationship between events. If  and −1 are Poisson variables and if the Bernoulli
variables are i.i.d.,  is also a Poisson variable. Parameters are retained in order
to ensure the stationarity of .
With the INARmodel, the predictive ability of past events decreases with senior-
ity, which is in accordance with real-life data. However the autocorrelation structure
is similar to that of a linear process, and this feature does not fit the data in non-life
insurance. Let us consider the covariances between a time series of count variables.
In a Poisson model with dynamic random eﬀects, these covariances are obtained
from the autocorrelation coeﬃcient applied to the overdispersion of the count vari-
able. With the INAR specification, the autocorrelation coeﬃcient is applied to the
total variance of the count variable, and data speak in favor of the preceding formu-
lation in non-life insurance.14 Considering mixtures of INAR processes can alleviate
this shortcoming (see Gouriéroux and Jasiak, 2004).
6.3 Allowance for the severity of claims in experience rating
Multi equation models can be used to allow for the severity of claims involving third
party liability, from the dichotomy between claims with or without bodily injury (see
Picard (1976), Lemaire (1995)). The number of claims with bodily injury follows a
binomial distribution, indexed by the number of claims and by a probability which
follows a beta distribution in the random eﬀects model. Nesting this random eﬀect
in a negative binomial model yields a linear predictor based on the number of claims
of both types.
For guarantees related to property damage or theft, a cost equation on claims
can be considered. Gamma or log-normal distributions provide a good fit to cost
data without thick tails.15 A two equation model with Poisson distributions for the
number of claims and log-normal distributions for their cost admits closed form es-
timators for the second order moments of bivariate random eﬀects (Pinquet (1997)).
The correlation between the random eﬀects related to the number and cost equations
appears to be very low for the sample investigated in the aforementioned article. Be-
cause of this low correlation, the bonus-malus coeﬃcients related to pure premium
are close to the product of the coeﬃcients for frequency and expected cost per claim.
14Also, the prediction derived from the INAR(1) model is derived from the number of events
restricted to the last period. This is an unpleasant property if events are claims, as all the claims
in the past have some predictive ability.
15Log-normal distributions have however thicker tails than the gamma, as they are of the subex-
ponential type.
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In a recent publication, Frees and Valdez (2008) propose a three equation model
corresponding to the frequency, type and cost of claims. The first equation is a
random eﬀects Poisson regression model, the second is a multinomial logit model,
and the cost component is a Burr XII long-tailed distribution. A t-copula function
is used to specify the joint multivariate distribution of the cost of claims arising from
these various claims types.
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